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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses dollarization from the perspective of the relation between country and
devaluation risk. In the absence of balance sheet effects, we find that a full dollarization of an
economy increases its country risk. On the other hand, when balance sheet effects are present, the
full dollarization could reduce country risk.
The link between these two risks is based on the government’s financial needs. In this paper
government devalue the currency for fiscal purposes. Consequently, a full dollarization closes this
avenue transferring the whole cost to bond holders. This paper stresses the idea that dollarization is
at the very end a fiscal issue.
Empirically, using the ratio of foreign currency deposit on total deposits as a proxy to the balance
sheet effect, the paper tests the importance of this variable on country risk. We find that the balance
sheet has a positive effect on country risk, in other words, country with higher balance sheet effect
should have higher country risk.
* The authors wish to thank the support and the hospitality of the InterAmerican Development Bank. Also we would like to thank
Ernesto Stein and Jorge Streb for very helpful comments, Ritu Basu from IMF and Ricardo Adrogué from Salomon Smith
Barney provided us some of the data used and special thanks to Eliana Carranza and Juan Francisco Castro for superb
research assistance.
2I.  MOTIVATION
One of the many criticisms that the dollarization proposals have received is that there are no
observations in the sample to infer what will happen if an economy adopts a fully dollarized
monetary system.  The announcement of former President Mahuad to attempt a dollarization of
Ecuador has heated up the debate and will also provide another observation to a very narrow
sample.1 Instead of waiting for more events we present a very simple framework in which the
basic issues can be analyzed.
In the context of the dollarization debate, Fernandez-Arias and Talvi (1999) discuss the different
policies that governments could implement to minimize the impact of a real exchange rate shock.
Calvo (1999b) and Hausmann, Gavin, Pagés-Serra and Stein (1999) address the question of
which is the optimal currency arrangement for emergent economies. In addition, Hausmann,
Panizza and Stein (1999) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) discuss the characteristics of
these currency regimes. In this context, we discuss the rather unexplored relationship between
country risk and devaluation risk. Powell and Sturzenegger (2000) focus on the empirical question
on how much interest rate reduction an emergent country should expect from the elimination of the
currency risk.2 In this respect we agree with these authors that this reduction of the interest rate
could be for some countries the most substantial (but potential) benefit from dollarization.
The bottom line of the paper is to stress the idea that dollarization is at the very end a fiscal issue
and it has costs as the country risk may go up while the devaluation risk disappears. A
successfully dollarized economy will be one in which there are no obstacles to finance contingent
fiscal deficits. In this respect, the recent decision of Ecuador might prove that dollarizing is not
enough in itself. It has to come with a comprehensive program aimed to satisfy the current and
future fiscal constraints. If the government cannot finance this unexpected deficit it could choose to
satisfy these constraints by confiscating the domestic agents by devaluing its currency or defaulting
on its external obligations. Institutional investors will have a perception of the real intention of the
government and this will drive the country risk up or the devaluation risk up depending on their
priors on who is more likely to get confiscated by the government.
One of the main issues on this debate is whether the dollarization option implies lower interest
rates.3 This is due to the fact that they are giving up an instrument (the exchange rate) that enables
an economy to face an external shock. A dollarized economy ties his hands and therefore it is seen
as less able to react to different shocks. In this paper we put special emphasis to the fact that most
of the emergent countries face the potentially disruptive balance sheet effects as they share the
characteristic of being liability dollarized.
                                                                
1 Since that announcement, El Salvador has moved towards full dollarization, and Guatemala announces its
intention toward a full dollarization.
2 See Neumeyer and Nicolini (2000) for a related paper but using a different approach.
3 Powell and Sturzenegger (2000) point out arguments that might explain either an increase or a decrease in
country risk suggesting that both results are feasible.
3We also find theoretical support to the idea of implementing a dollarization strategy with a
contingent credit facility. We put special emphasis on the fact that this insurance scheme should be
at a not-distorted price. If there is some implicit subsidy, it will reproduce the same credibility
issues that alternative stabilization policies face.
In addition, this paper supports the stylized fact presented by Hausmann, Panizza and Stein
(1999) where they show that emerging countries float differently from the way developed
countries do. The reason of this difference is that floating emergent countries need a substantial
amount of foreign reserves as collateral to avoid a higher country risk. Floaters are forced –by the
market- to float with lots of reserves compared to M2 or debt obligations. On the other hand,
developed economies can endure huge fluctuations in the exchange rate (domestic confiscation)
because nobody questions the possibility of an external default.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we present a simple model of confiscation risks. In
Section III we simulate the model to see what might happen with the currency and country risks
under two different scenarios, one in which balance sheet effects are absent and another in which
they are important. In Section IV we discuss the role of contingent credit lines as a policy
recommendation that might go along with dollarization.  Finally, in Section V we present
preliminary results of the country risk model for 10 emerging countries and we close the paper
with some final remarks and directions for further research on this topic.
II.  A SIMPLE MODEL OF CONFISCATION RISKS
In order to think about the relevant issues in the decision of dollarizing an economy we consider
the following simple setup. We assume a one-good, two-period open economy with the following
agents.4
The Government
The government’s basic decision is how to face the uncertainty of having good and bad times.
When bad times arrives, we assume that the government does not have other alternatives to
finance the adverse shock but confiscating. In this case, the government will be forced to decide
between confiscate the domestic agents through devaluation or confiscate the institutional investor
defaulting on its external obligations. We impose the uncertainty in such a way that when bad times
hit the economy the government will not have other choice but to confiscate one of the two or
both.
The expected budget constraint of the government is:
                                                                
4 The model is quite similar to the one presented in chapter 6 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
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The government revenue is stochastic and follows a simple rule. The realized revenue in good
times is r0 and that happens with probability (1-p). The realized revenue in bad times is r1 and that
happens with probability p. Obviously, r0 > r1. The fiscal revenues available contingent on the
state of the world are represented by r.5
With those resources the government has to meet both its domestic outlays (g/E0) and its external
obligations (1+iL)b. E0 is the current exchange rate and g is the nominal expenditure of the
government measured in domestic currency. The government issues external bonds (b) in dollars
that pay iL interest. When good times hit the economy the realized government budget surplus is:
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In that case, the government has no problem to satisfy its internal and external obligations and life
goes on.  However, in bad times the realized government budget surplus is:
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Therefore, the government will have to either devalue or default. The amount that the government
needs to obtain from these alternatives is:
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The government of that emergent country might default on the interests due plus a share (a) of the
principal. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the government will always start a default with
the interest payment and it will not compromise a default on the principal (hereafter a=0). The
government will confiscate a fraction a  of this amount to the foreign investors by means of an
external debt default, and a fraction (1-a ) to the domestic agents using a devaluation.
The model assumes that the economy does not have other way to finance but to confiscate in case
the bad shock arrives. We do not believe that this is the only way countries face an adverse
shock, governments could reduce its expenditure, lost reserves among other alternatives. The goal
                                                                
5 Emerging economies tend to be subject to large swings of their terms of trade and/or fluctuations in the cost
of borrowing funds from abroad. As suggested by Fernandez-Arias and Talvi (1999) these changes may
require large real exchange rate depreciations.
5of the confiscation assumption is to simplify the exposition of the problems. We will discuss this
issue in section V.
If the government has other choices to cover the contingent liability, as for example reducing g (its
expenditures), the possibility of confiscation should never exist, and consequently, the country risk
should disappear. In other words, if there is no confiscation risk, country and devaluation risk
should disappear in the context of this paper.
The Role of Balance Sheet Effects
However, the depreciation in itself potentially creates another cost. Once the government chooses
to devalue the households and/or the firms with dollar liabilities may have to endure a negative
wealth effect. This negative wealth effect in known in the literature as balance sheet effect. In this
paper, the balance sheet effect is represented by the function h(DE)6, where DE represents the
expected real devaluation7. Fernandez-Arias and Talvi (1999) showed that the devaluation should
be in real terms to play a role in the balance sheet effect.
As Calvo and Reinhart (2000) showed, there are economies with floating regimes that do not
allow the exchange rate to move further away from a narrow band. One reason behind this fear of
floating is that a sizeable depreciation could bring havoc in a banking system that is partially
dollarized as firms are not fully hedged. The evidence of Calvo and Reinhart (2000) suggest that a
reasonable way to model this characteristic is using a function such as:
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Where the balance sheet cost appears when the devaluation is higher that a certain threshold e. In
the above balance sheet function there are three key parameters: i) g  is a scale variable (assuming
g>1). A higher g  will impose a higher cost of devaluations. ii) the parameter e  allows for a non-
linear relationship between the size of devaluations and its associated cost, and iii) the dummy
variable D shows if the country is fully dollarized or not, where D=0 the economy is fully
dollarized. An economy with no balance sheet effects will be one in which h(DE) = 0. Figure 1
depicts a general h(DE) function where e>0, g>0 and D=1.
                                                                
6 The importance of this effect in liability dollarized economies has been recently stressed by Calvo (1998),
Calvo (1999) and Krugman (1999).
7 The model suppose that h’(DE)>0, as the cost of the bailout increases with the size of the devaluation.
6Fig.1 The h(DE) function with e>0, g>0, h>0
If there were a possibility that the government decides to devalue next period in order to collect
resources, the scheme for the next period exchange rate would be:8
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Therefore, the expected exchange rate will be Ee=(1-p)E0+pE1. From this we can derive the
following expression for the currency risk:
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From this formula one can infer the relationship between country and devaluation risk as iL shows
up. However, we need to explain what is behind the interest rate iL. In order to do so we need to
introduce an institutional investor and derive an expression for the country risk.
Before going to the institutional investor section, let us discuss a further equation (6.). This
equation provides an insight about how much does the government should devalue, in case it
                                                                
8 This equation should not be interpreted as the balance sheet depending on amount of bond issued by the
government. As it would be seen in the Institutional Investor section, the reason of having the balance sheet
effect in this equation is because the balance sheet effect is specified in terms of per unit of bond issued.
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7needs. The left hand side of the equation (6.) shows the government revenue of a devaluation,
measure by  (
10 E
g
E
g - ), because a given g and E0 an increase in E1 means that the government
needs less real resources to pay its debts. On the other side of the equation, h represents the
additional cost of a devaluation, as creates a new liability for the government. Depending how
these two equations behave the government will decide the rate of devaluation for fiscal
purposes.9
Going further with this idea, figure 2 shows a simple simulation on the fiscal cost and benefit of a
devaluation. First, the benefit is measured as the saved real resources due to the devaluation. For
example suppose that the government expenditure is 1000 pesos and the exchange rate is equal to
1. So, a 10 percent devaluation means that the government will save almost 92 dollars, and this
profit function is represented by R in figure 2; whereas the cost function is defined by the balance
sheet effect, which is the function h explained above. This cost function is represented by Hi in
figure 2, where i represent different balance sheet effects. Then, the trade off between these two
functions determines the size of a devaluation for fiscal purposes.
Suppose that a country has a large balance sheet effect, in the sense that a small devaluation
generates huge fiscal cost (shown in figure 2 as function H1). If the government of this country
wants to use the devaluation as a way of collecting resources, this government would have to
devalue at least e1. On the other hand, if the shape of the cost function is as H2, this country could
collect resources with a smaller devaluation.
                                                                
9 This paper assumes that the government devalue only for fiscal proposes and there are no others reason to
do that.
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Fig2. Fiscal cost (H) and benefit (R) of a devaluation
Although the main issue of this paper is not measuring the optimal devaluation rate for fiscal
purposes, the issue of the effect of the balance sheet at the time the government decides the rate of
devaluation arises. Table 1 shows selected information for some of the financial crises of the last
decade. The information is selected taking into account the paper by Fernandez-Arias and Talvi
(2000), where they show that the balance sheet effect arises when countries have real exchange
rate devaluations.
The nominal and real devaluation are self-explained, the variable Stock Exchange is the ratio of
the stock index on the spot exchange rate, and the fiscal cost is how much the government paid in
order to avoid a generalized bankruptcy due to the financial crisis. We use a broad definition of
financial crisis, this could be a banking crisis, the devaluation itself, etc. So, this fiscal cost should
not be interpreted as the balance sheet effect due just to the devaluation.
To construct the table, we took as the base month the month of the devaluation, from there we
consider the highest nominal devaluation during the next six months. Taking these two months we
complete the information shown on the table. This table shows that emerging markets have a
higher real devaluation than developed countries, and higher fiscal cost.
According to the assumptions made in the paper, if H1 represents an emerging market and H2 a
developed country, the results would be: (i) emerging markets have higher nominal devaluations
than developed countries (the optimal devaluation rate for developed countries is e2; (ii) the
balance sheet effects should be higher in developing countries; and (iii) emerging markets should
show higher fiscal costs due to the devaluation.
R
 H1
     H2
9Table 1 shows the above characteristics. The goal of the table is to emphasize the role could have
been played by the balance sheet effect at the time government decided its policies. The table
does not intent to be the empirical test of the above proposition.
Table 1
Fiscal Cost of Devaluations
Date of Crisis Nominal
Devaluation
Real
Devaluation
Stock Exchange
Index
Fiscal Cost
% of GDP
Mexico 94 97% 72% -64% 19%
Indonesia 97 184% 162% -57% 50%
Malaysia 97 73% 70% -68% 16%
Thailand 97 83% 75% -61% 33%
France 92 17% 17% 14% n.a.
Sweden 92 34% 32% 4% 4.5
UK 92 24% 27% -10% n.a.
Sources: IFS for exchange rate, Bloomberg for stock exchange, and Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) bail out
cost. n.a.-not avalilable
An Institutional Investor
An institutional investor may take position on safe bonds (t-bills) with no default risk (B) that pays
an interest rate of i. The other asset is a risky bond from an emergent market (a Brady bond),
which we denote by (b), and pays iL.  As expected the benefits from this operations might be less
due to the possibility of default from the emergent economy. The probability attached to that event
is denoted by p.
The amount of default is a [a+iL+h(DE)]b. We should understand a as the perceived willingness
to pay of the government on its external obligations. As the 1980s debt default showed,
governments instead of raising more taxes to repay their external obligations preferred to default.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) make this point. Clearly aÎ[0,1].  The institutional investors bear the
cost of a potential bailout.10 The total cost of the potential bailout is given by h(DE)b.
Therefore, the expected profits of the institutional investor is:11
                                                                
10 As the model does not include banks or private firms there are no more options for the government than
imposing that extra cost to the institutional investor. This is just a simplifying assumption.
11 When the good shock hit the economy the institutional investor is not subject to the possibility of a
confiscation.
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This investor has a total net worth of:
NW = b + B (9.)
Plugging (9) in (8) and deriving the expected profits with respect to b, we obtain the optimal
decision on how much to invest in emerging market bonds. From the FOC we can obtain the
following expression:
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A first result so far is that when there is no probability of default (p=0), the iL=i and when there is
no potential bailout cost (h(.) = 0),  
a
a
p
api
i L
-
+=
1
In addition, we define country risk in this model (from equation 10) as:
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From this, the rate of return in domestic currency terms is:
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Where the exchange rate risk could be expressed in terms of the fundamental parameters of the
model as:
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III.  SIMULATIONS FROM THE MODEL
In this section we consider two possible scenarios. In the first one, the economy does not have
balance sheet effects. Depreciations are neutral to wealth for all agents. In a second case, we
discuss the scenario in which the monetary authorities have a bias against allowing large
depreciations of their domestic currency.
Case I: No Balance Sheet Effects
First we explore the option to dollarize an economy that does not suffer from balance sheet
effects. Therefore,  h(DE) = 0 as all agents in the economy are able to hedge against the risk of a
devaluation. Simulating the model we obtained the following propositions:
Proposition 1: The country risk and the devaluation risk are negatively correlated.
Graph 1 shows the negative relationship between country risk and devaluation risk for different
values of a . It shows that the cost of reducing one type of risk is the increase of the other type of
risk. Graph 2 shows this result explicitly, recall that the value of a  represents the degree of
confiscation from international investors; a higher a  means a higher country risk and a lower
devaluation risk. Then, a=1 means that the devaluation risk is zero and the country risk reaches
its highest value. In other words, a  equal to one can be interpret as the economy being totally
dollarized. In this case, the country will have a zero devaluation risk but the highest country risk.
The model suggests that when a non-dollarized economy decides for full dollarization will face a
higher country risk.
Proposition 2: For low (high) values of a  an increase in the foreign interest rate has a
stronger effect on the devaluation risk (country risk) compared to the
effect on the country risk (devaluation risk).
Graphs 3 to 5 show the behavior of both devaluation risk and country risk when the free risk
interest rate increases after controlling for different a ’s. We use three values of a  to illustrate the
differences (0.05, 0.5 and 0.95).
These graphs show that both risks increase when the free risk interest rate increases, but its effect
on both risks will depend on the value of a .  For low values of a , for example in Graph 3 when
a  takes the value 0.05, not only the devaluation risk is more important than the country risk, but
also the effect of an increase of the free risk interest rate is stronger in this devaluation risk.  On
the other hand, for high values of a , as an example you can see Graph 5 (a=0.95), this result is
reversed where the stronger effect is on the country risk.
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Proposition 3: An economy that faces foreign interest rate shocks will present a high
correlation between the country risk and the devaluation risk.
Graph 6 shows the scatter diagram for country risk and devaluation risk when the free risk interest
rate increases given that a  is equal to 0.95. This graph shows that although the effect of an
increase in the free risk interest rate affect both risks, these two risks are highly correlated.  This
high correlation hold for different values of a .
Note that while in Proposition 1 we allow a  to change, in this case we allow the foreign interest
rate to change holding a  constant.
Proposition 4: A contagion effect (an increase in the probability of a bad shock) will drive
up both the country risk and the devaluation risk.
Graph 9 and 10 show that an increase in the probability of default increases both devaluation risk
and country risk. The intuition of this statement is that a contagion effect will increase the
probability of a bad shock.
Proposition 5: An economy that suffers a dollarization process will have higher interest
rates in domestic currency and in dollars if has a high contingent fiscal
liability.  While an economy with low contingent fiscal liability will show a
lower interest rate in domestic currency but a higher interest rate in
dollars.
Contrary to the current belief that a dollarization will decrease the interest rate, Graphs 11 and 12
show that this result depends on how much the country risk goes up after a dollarization.
Depending on the level of the contingent fiscal liability the interest rates will go up or down.
Case II: Dollarizing under Balance Sheet Effects
A more interesting case is when h(DE) reflects the cost of allowing the exchange rate to
depreciate in a partially dollarized economy. We perform a simulation study and the following
propositions arise:
Proposition 6: The presence of a significant bailout cost will generate a non-linear
relationship between the currency risk and the default risk
13
In Graph 13 we can see that once we assume that balance sheet effects matter, the trade-off
between the currency and the exchange risk will show a non-linearity. The upward part of the
curve will be almost non-existent if the h(.) function approaches zero. Therefore, financially
vulnerable economies will find optimal to avoid currency depreciations as a way to reduce the
country risk, more specifically these countries will try to reduce currency risk exposure through
high levels of international reserves (See Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).   For values of the
devaluation risk higher than a certain threshold a higher a, i.e. a greater commitment with the
exchange rate, will decrease the exchange rate risk while the country risk increases.
Proposition 7: A fully dollarized economy might obtain -under some conditions- a lower
country risk.
In Graph 15 we present the case for adopting a full dollarized economy. An economy could either
choose to be in point B with a low exchange rate commitment (a<1) and with a given level of
country risk or in point A with the same level of country risk but as the economy is fully dollarized
with zero devaluation risk. The bottom line is: if you live with fear, why don’t you fix it for your
life? The same can be analyzed in Graph 16, in which staying at a high level of partial dollarization
(a>0.8) is the worst possible situation as the potential bailout cost due to currency mismatches
increases the country and the devaluation risk as well.
Proposition 8: A banking system with a higher degree of liability dollarization will make
the economy more vulnerable.
In Graph 14 we plot one economy with a higher bailout cost than other, represented as a higher
value of the parameter g . We can say that an economy with a higher degree of liability
dollarization will be more vulnerable to external shocks and therefore will face a higher potential
bailout cost.  Basically, an economy in which balance sheet effects are sizeable will face a higher
combination of exchange rate risk and country risk compared to another economy with potentially
lower balance sheet effects.
Proposition 9: Under the presence of balance sheet effects, a full dollarization of the
economy might reduce the local interest rate in dollars.
If our starting point is an aMIN<a<1 (see Graph 17) the option to fully dollarize the economy will
reduce the local interest rate on dollars. This should not be a surprise as a higher a reduces the
devaluation risk and the spread between the interest rate on dollars and the interest rate on
domestic currency. Clearly, for economies that are not sufficiently dollarized (a<aMIN » 0.2)
adopting the full dollarization proposal will not make sense as there is no gain in lower interest
rates.
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IV. THE ROLE OF A CREDIT LINE (NOW CALLED “BLINDAJE”)
Using equation (1), the theoretical model claims that if a country is willing to lend and borrow
whatever it wants, this country will never face a fiscal financing problem because it can lend the
resources left over after a good shock and can borrow in case of a bad shock. This result means
that the government will not need to confiscate anybody, as result, this country will have neither
devaluation nor country risk. In other words, the domestic rate on domestic currency and foreign
currency are equal to the free risk interest rate.
On the other hand, if the country has limited access to the capital market, the consequences
explained early in the paper arises, where the possibility of having an unexpected deficit can not be
financed. The existence of this credit constraint generates both devaluation and country risk,
where the magnitude of each risk depends on the government’s decision of which sector would be
confiscated in case the bad shock materializes. Note that, first, the paper assumes that the
government does not have other alternatives but to confiscate so far, and second, the problem
emerges when the government is not allowed to finance a deficit, although this government could
have an intertemporal sustainable budget. Under this context, the completeness of the market can
be achieved if the economy could get a credit line to finance the bad shock scenario. The
introduction of this financial tool would eliminate both risks.
Being more realistic, when an adverse shock hit the economy, government do have others
alternative to collect resources, for example this government could increase taxes, reduce
expenditure.  Sometimes the authority is not able to meet its entire obligation once the financial
crisis emerged12.  In this case, although the government’s fiscal position could be sustainable
intertemporally, investors are afraid that the government can not honor its obligation. The existence
of this possibility should create the country and devaluation risk. As was mention earlier, if the
government were able to obtain a credit line to finance its deficit, both, devaluation and country
risk should disappear.  An example of this financial tool is the Stand-By credit line granted by the
International Monetary Fund. As a result, to overcome a financial crisis the government could
combine a sound economic plan plus a credit line.
Therefore, although a dollarization can eliminate the balance sheet effect, it will not eliminate the
possibility of the bad shock scenario. In this case, if the government decides to full dollarize the
economy without the option of using the capital market, this economy would benefit of hiring a
credit line. This benefit is a reduction of the both domestic interest rates, in term of foreign and
domestic currency, to the risk free interest rate.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
                                                                
12 Political economy (preguntar a Ernesto sobre citas)
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The model calls for an estimation of a country risk equation and a currency risk equation. Both
should be treated as endogenous. Due to lack of data we could not complete enough series of
currency risk to perform the whole exercise. We estimate the country risk equation (11.) from the
model and delay for further research the estimation of a currency risk equation.
The model suggests that four types of variables should explain country risk: (i) those that reflect
the safe asset return, (ii) those that are idiosyncratic to each particular economy, (iii) those
affecting the probability of an adverse shock, and the government’s decision to whom should be
confiscated in case the bad shock arises, and iv) those variables measuring the balance sheet
effect.
In the first category we include the yield of 30-year US Treasury bills. In the second category we
include the return of the stock exchange measured in dollar terms lagged one period. In the third
category, we also include an indicator of international liquidity (the ratio M2 to foreign reserves) as
a measure of the ability to pay the external debt; and a proxy for the terms of trade shocks (the
variation of FOREX reserves) a proxy for the probability of bad shocks affecting each country.13
Additionally we should include the fiscal stance and the output growth to capture the potential
repayment problems that might arise. These last two variables are not included in the results
shown below. These variables are somewhat captured in the regressions as we include the lagged
endogenous variable as an explanatory variable.
With respect to the last variable, due to data availability we chose to include the dollarization ratio
as a measurement of the balance sheet effect. This variable is calculated using the International
Financial Statistics, published by the IMF, as the ratio of Foreign Liabilities (26c) over the sum of
Demand Deposits (24), Time, Savings and Foreign Currency Deposits (25).  In the case of
Argentina and Peru, the data used come from their respective Central Banks.
Finally, we include a dummy variable to account for the Russian crises, but we might include
political factors that have affected the country risk of some countries (for example Indonesia or
Peru) and an interaction variable between the effect of a change in the U.S. interest rate and
money supply.
The monthly database covers 1997.01 to 2000.10. The countries in our sample include 5 Latin
American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), 4 Asian countries
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) and 1 Transition economy (Poland). The sample of
countries was chosen on data availability considerations. We exclude several countries, as the
data was insufficient.
The model is estimated within a SUR framework as we expect that idiosyncratic shocks will affect
the behavior or other countries due to real or financial contagion. The results are shown in Table
2. We find the following empirical facts: (i) a positive and significant relationship between country
                                                                
13 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) suggested that terms of trade shocks will affect foreign reserves and therefore the
variation of foreign reserves is a good proxy.
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risk and the dollarization ratio; (ii) external factors as the Russian crisis are important; (iii) the
lagged endogenous variable was significant, and (iv) no clear effect of changing the US interest
rate.
Although this is an incomplete test due to data availability, we still can observe an indication of the
potential consequences of the so-called “balance sheet effect”.
VI.  CONCLUSION
We learned once the relevance of the intertemporal fiscal sustainability with hyperinflation
episodes. This paper teaches us the same lesson of fiscal sustainability in the context of the
dollarization debate.
Under the assumption that there is a deficit that needs to be financed, investors will expect some
reaction from the government: either lose reserves, increase its debt or print money. Another way
to accomplish the objective when all these avenues are banned is to confiscate somebody
devaluating the domestic currency or defaulting on its external obligations.  In this sense, a full
dollarization closes one of the last two sources of confiscation, the devaluation; as result, the
dollarization transfers the cost of confiscation from one sector to another.
Concerning the effects over the interest rate, the paper present two cases, with and without
balance sheet effects.  These results are: i) when the economy does not face a balance sheet
effect, as the devaluation risk disappears, the country risk goes up, and ii) when the economy face
a balance sheet effect, a dollarization could reduce country risk.  A caveat of the second result is
that, the higher the balance sheet effect, the higher the reduction in the country risk.
Empirically, using the ratio of foreign currency deposit on total deposits as a proxy to the balance
sheet effect, the paper tests the importance of this variable on country risk. We find that the
balance sheet has a positive effect on country risk.
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Graph 1: Trade-off between Country Risk and Devaluation Risk
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Graph 2: Country and devaluation risks for different values of alpha
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Graph 3: Country and devaluation risks with small alpha=0.05
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Graph 4: Country and Devaluation risks for alpha=0.5
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Graph 5: Country and Devaluation risks with high alpha=0.95
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Graph 6: Correlation between Country and Devaluation Risk
high alpha=0.95
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Graph 7: Country risk for different values of alpha
(dollarized economy alpha=1)
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Graph 8: Devaluation Risk for different values of alpha
(dollarized economy alpha=1)
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Graph 9: Devaluation Risk under Contagion Effects
Sudden increase in the probability of adverse shock
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Graph 10: Country Risk with Contagion Effects
Sudden increase in the probability of an adverse shock
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Graph 11: Dollarization under High Contingent Fiscal Liability
(g=100)
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Graph 12: Dollarization under Low Contingent Fiscal Liability
(g=15) 
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Graph 13: Nonlinear Trade-off with Balance Sheet Effects
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Graph 15: Fixing for your Life or Living with Fear?
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Graph 16: Country and Currency Risks
for different values of alpha with balance sheet effects
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Graph 17: The effect on interest rates 
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TABLE 2
SUR ESTIMATES OF THE COUNTRY RISK REGRESSION
All countries. 1997.01-2000.10
Country Dollarization Ratio M2 / Reserves Terms of Trade Stock Exchange US
T-bills
Lagged
Endogenous
Russian Crisis Interaction
variable
Argentina 1479.65 * -1671.57  -1.64 -125.23** 2.70  0.43 * 292.24 * 2.69
Brazil 1627.51 -29.07  -1.21 11.04 -1.80 0.67 * 334.05 * 0.06
Indonesia 5.91  -461.34** 0.42 -4.09 -4.45* 0.52 * 138.91 0.66 **
Korea 1074.20 * -185.84  0.85* -19.43** -1.70 0.56 * 196.20 * 0.25
Malaysia -776.29  3854.71  * 0.77 -1.27 17.65 * 0.61 * n.i. -6.57*
Mexico 2009.11 ** -187.25  -1.51** -16.74 -0.89  0.69 * 234.87 * 0.21
Peru 984.12 *** 118.52  0.13 -61.30*** -0.14 0.49 * 255.04 * -0.23
Poland 1764.30 * 324.36 -0.98* -29.52** 0.38 0.24 * 59.37 * -0.50
Thailand 548.60 * -458.31 1.55*** -48.71** -3.73*** 0.55 * 315.00 * 0.69
Venezuela 11143.63 *** 193.91  -1.02 -83.24 -0.02  0.70 * 617.74 * 0.25
Notes: * significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 10%, n.i. not included.
